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vision that they can only see what their Grand Theory permits them 
to see -- that is, that the choice of Grand theory itself amounts 
to no more than a declaration of the policy-maker's taste 
preferences. 
A. LAW AS POLICY'S IMPLEMENTER 
Policy itself brings no social change. If a politicl 
authority declares (let us say) a policy favoring free markets, 
that does not cause free markets to blossom hither and yon. If 
declared policy to end inflation asserts the need to cut the money 
supply, the money supply will not obediently reduce its size. 
Until transformed into law commanding relevant actors to behave in 
desired ways, policy remains mere rhetoric (Lowi 1987). 
For a variety of reasons, some scholars denied the potential 
efficiacy of law. Here we discuss only two of these. First, some 
insisted that, since no one can isolate a law's effect on social 
behavior from other factors (Kidder 1983), attempts to use law 
instrumentally can at best be hit-or-miss, at worst, dangerous. A 
law-maker necessarily unsure about the consequences of a law places 
society at serious risk. For example, if a law-maker does not know 
with a high degree of certainty how a new law will affect 
agricultural production, it might lead to a disastrous reduction in 
the food supply. Better, they say, to make only small, incremental 
changes (cf. Lindblom, 19AA). 
That objection assumes that because lawmakers typically do 
little research on the reasons for behavior in the face of a rule 
of law, they lack the capability of doing so. Absent adequate 
research, of course a lawmaker who attempts more than incremental 
change acts recklessly. That by no means argues that knowledge of 
law's consequences for behavior lie beyond the reach of research. 
Secondly, some legal scholars follow deconstructionism. 
Inherent ambiguity renders a law's language like silly putty (e.g., 
Tushnet 1985; Singer 1984). This ambiguity permits administrators 
and judges to construe it at will, too often to benefit the rich 
and powerful. However much reason informed by experience 
conhtrolled the policy- and law-making processes, they constitute 
mere illusion; in the end, power motivated by inhterest and 
prejudice controls. Although reasonable speakers of a language may 
disagree about the meaning of the penumbra of words, however, they 
usually can agree on its core meanings (Hart 1960:124) . 1 Courts 
or administrative agencies typically redefine meanings only in 
cases that turn on the ambiguities in the penumbra. Agencies need 
not inevitably interpret laws to serve the rich and powerful. 
1 A local ordinance that. states that "No vehicles may be 
driven in the park" plainly prohibits driving automobiles in the 
park; that constitutes a core-meaning case. Whether it prohibits a 
motor-driven wheel chair for a disabled person does not seem at all 
clear; that constitutes a penumbra! case. Culturally-acquired 
understandings that the ordinance aims to protect the peace of the 
park permit construction of the word "vehicle" to prohibit 
automobiles, but to admit wheelchairs (cf. Fuller, 1958). 
Devices to lower the risk of that omnipresent danger exist; 
research can discover them. 
These two objections to the use of reason informed by experience 
to control effective policy-making confuse frequent sorts of lapses 
from that ideal with the inevitability of those same lapses. The 
objections that flow from philosophical positivism and from post-
modernism search deeper. 
B. THE POSITIVIST OBJECTION 
Philosophical positivism makes a sharp distinction between 
facts and values, Is and Ought, description and prescription. The 
Is, they say, can never determine the Ought. 
Policy inherently concerns the Ought. Policy states what the 
policy-maker proposes to do; it states his prescriptions for the 
polity. All law implements policy; all law therefore concerns the 
Ought. Decisions about the Ought can never derive from the Is. 
Reason can help in determining policy, but not experience. 
In that view, the function of empirical research in policy-
and law-making consists merely in advising decision-makers about 
the consequences of various possible courses of action (Weber 
1949). What course the decision-maker chooses depends upon the sort 
of person he is. 
Development practitioners often perceive their task as one of 
providing options for decision-makers. They usually do so by 
describing alternative scenarios: If the law-maker does thus-and-
so, then these will be the likely consequences. The choice rests 
with the law-maker. Providing alternative scenarios or options has 
a deceptive air of neutrality, comfortably relieving the consultant 
of any responsibility for the outcome. By choosing which scenarios 
to offer, however, the consultant effectively structures choice. 
Henry Kissinger, the former American Secretary of State, is said to 
have remarked that if he had the opportunity to specify the 
options, he did not care who made the final decision. Not 
empirically-bottomed description of probable scenarios, but the 
values of the researcher determine outcomes. 
Philosophical positivism leads to the most popular 
prescription for a policy-making methodology, ends-means: "[I]n 
order to decide rationally, policy-makers must specify their 
objectives; lay out the alternatives by which the objectives may be 
accomplished; evaluate the consequences of each alternative; and 
choose the action that maximizes net benefits" (Majone 1989:12 2 ; 
cf. Lindblom 1963). 
The choice of ends depends on Ought propositions, that is, on 
values; the choice of means, on Is propositions, that is, on facts. 
In determining what ends to pursue, law-makers rely on values 
(Majone 1989), either their own or those identified as community 
opinion (Long 1969). This assumption of an Is-Ought dichotomy has 
four adverse consequences. First, if ends depend entirely upon 
'values', and if experience and values suffer a complete divorce, 
2 Majone uses the term "decisionism" for what we here call 
"ends-means". 
then the process of choosing particular ends precludes 
consideration of social experience. Ends-means limits 
investigation primarily to assessing the consequences of employing 
alternative means to attain the ends chosen according to 
authority's (not necessarily stated) values. 
Second, in the ends-means approach, law-makers typically 
proceed directly from stating their goals to proposing possible 
solutions. Because it contains no explicit requirement that they 
investigate the causes of social problems, law-makers have no way 
of ensuring that their solutions will do more than poultice 
symptoms. Because they exclude consideration of causes, ends-means 
decision-makers exclude academics (whose special expertise consists 
of research into causes) from contributing to the law-making 
process Universities embody most third world countries' richest 
reserve of social knowledge, but ends-means often excludes their 
expertise from law-making (Coleman 1975:19); Braybrooke 1965:2). 
Third, by assigning means exclusively to the realm of the 1..§., 
ends-means implies an amoral thrust. If the choice of means 
excludes valuations, its ethical status rests solely on the 
proclaimed validity of the ends: The ends justify the means. 
Finally, ends-means implies an authoritarian perspective. If 
law-makers need not bring experience to bear upon their choice of 
ends, they need not provide the public with evidence to justify 
their proposals. They need only claim that these goals represent 
the values of the society's leaders (Weber 1949). In this view, 
the legitimacy of policies turns, not on rationality based on 
experience, but on the presumed legitimacy of the policy-maker. 
Inevitably, the ends-means methodology bolsters hierarchy. 
Those in power make policy. Superiors give orders to subordinates; 
subordinates only need seek how best to carry them out. The world 
around, this approach permeates most 'modern' institutions. People 
receive their education in hierarchically-organized schools; work 
in hierarchically-organized enterprises; when ill, go to 
hierarchically-organized hospitals; and, when dead, rest in 
hierarchically-organized cemeteries. In most third world export 
enclaves, property-ownership regimes endow a few individuals -- the 
owners -- with the power to decide economic ends. Most citizens 
exert limited (if any!) influence over the choice of means. Even 
in polities proclaiming representative democracy, a few officials 
typically enjoy enormous decision-making power. 3 
The ends-means methodology limits participation in political 
decision-making to elections in which voters periodically vote for 
leaders whose value-sets they believe most reflect their own. In 
practice, this transforms voting from a system of citizen 
participation in decision-making, resting on the use of reason 
informed by experience, to a choice of leaders based on taste. That 
degrades the democratic process to the "mobilization of bias" 
(Bachrach & Baratz 1963). 
To obscure its innate authoritarianism, proponents of the 
3 Thus their social practices too often reaffirm Ulpian's 
dictum: Because it pleases the prince, it has the force of law 
(Anton 1979). 
ends-means approach usually assert a societal value consensus. 
Since in real third world communities no value consensus did (or 
could) exist (Ch. 3), this claim too often served to justify 
policies that reflected, not the needs of the mass, but the 
interests of the rulers. In practice, third world governments' and 
international agencies' power to give or withhold resources 
commonly enabled them to impose their goals on target communities. 
Ignorant of community value sets, even benign agencies pushed 
programs embodying their own, not the beneficiaries', ends 
(Kalyalya et al. 1986) . As a result, as suggested by the desert of 
failed third world projects, community members equally frequently 
carried out the stated policies (if at all) only woodenly, or even 
actively undermined them (cf. Davidson 1992b; Klitgard 1991; Korten 
1990) . 
C. THE POST-MODERNIST OBJECTION 
In its seemingly endless variety, post-modernism aped the 
chameleon. At its heart, it challenged the Enlightment project 
Hunt, 19""). That project depended on the notion that people could 
understand their physical and social environments; understanding, 
they could create workable solutions to both physical and social 
problems. That post-modernism denied. 
It sprang from a proposition now widely accepted by many who 
deny post-modernism: That we can only see that for which we 
already have a concept or hypothesis (Gadamer, 19""; Popper, 
19""). Outcomes depend not only on the matters observed, but the 
hypotheses with which the observer entered the empirical arena. 
What determines whence policy-makers derive their hypotheses? 
Some scholars held that these derived from their world-views. 
Those world-views, they held, inherently defied empirical warrant. 
For some, world-views constituted ideal-types, setting out its 
vision of what the world might be -- an ideal market economy for 
the neo-classical economist, an ideally-function planned system for 
sonme varieties of socialists. For others, even to the extent that 
world-views contained descriptive proposition ("the deepest and 
moist common motivation for human action is material self-
interest"), these defied empirical warrant. Each world-view has 
its own built-in logic. That logic determines the search for data 
to warrant or diswarrant the propositions that make up the world-
view in question. Trying to diswarrant a world-view fell into 
inescapable circularity. 
Positivism denied a priori the possibility of using experience 
to formulate policy; all depended upon the subjective values of the 
policy-maker. Post-modernism went further: By denying the 
possibility of using experience to test whatever factual 
propositions underpinned a particular world-view, it denied the 
possibility of ever tesing a world-view against data. The next 
section contests both of these positions. 
II. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF TESTING WORLD-VIEWS AGAINST 
EXPERIENCE 
An alternative exists. It begins by adopting a problem-
solving rather than an ends-means methodology; argues that various 
devices exist for controlling discretionary choices in that 
process, of which control by large-scale explanations for the world 
(or 'Grand Theory') constitutes one; and that in principle 
researchers can put to empirical test the propositions that 
constitute Grand Theory. 
A. A PROBLEM-SOLVING METHODOLOGY 
In lieu of ends-means, with its chasm between Is and Ought, 
policy-makers can adopt a problem-solving methodology. That 
methodology consists of four steps: A statement of the behavior 
that constitutes the social problem (and data to test that 
statement); a set of alternative potential explanations for that 
behavior, and data to determine which of those explanations will 
survive; a set of alternative proposals for solution aimed at the 
causes revealed by the surviving explanations, and data to 
determine the most cost-effective (in a broad social sense) of 
those possible solutions; and its implementaqtion and monitoring 
(and data to warrant the propositions that constitute the results 
of the monitoring) (Seidman, 199A). 
B. GUIDING DISCRETIONARY CHOICE 
Critics object that whatever the possibility in principle of 
falsifying grand theory, in practice that remains beyond human 
reach. World views remain non-commensurable; reason informed by 
experience cannot persuade those who see the world through a 
different prism (Lauden 1984; Kuhn 1970; but cf. Lakatos & Musgrave 
1970). 
If valid, that criticism would return both grand theory and 
policy-making to the realms of taste: I like Marxism, you like 
nee-classical economics, in the same way that you like chocolate 
ice cream and I, vanilla. The criterion of reason informed by 
experience counts only as kitsch 4 : Mere mystification, myths to 
persuade peasants of government's legitimacy. Only those who focus 
on the efficacy of power -- pluralists, public choice theorists, 
and some Marxists -- have it right. 
Proponents of problem-solving contested the two arguments 
critics advanced as to why researchers could not falsify grand 
theory. First, by definition, the critics held that the general 
explanatory propositions characteristic of grand theory remained 
falsifiable only in terms of very general aggregate data -- all 
subject to debate. Unable to agree on the data's interpretation, 
researchers cannot agree on what counts as falsification (Kidder 
1983). In problem-solving, however, researchers logically derive 
middle-level propositions from grand theory to explain particular 
problems, and then regorously test them against evidence. To the 
extent that these middle-level propositions prove false, the grand 
4 
"Kitsch ... is the dazzling insipid smile that human beings 
use to cover what is 'essentially unacceptable in human life'" 
(Abrams, 1986:941). 
theory from which they derive may also prove false (Ch. 4:15). 
Second, the critics asserted that, in searching for the data 
to test middle level propositions, researchers must use spectacles 
with lenses ground from prescriptions derived from that same theory 
(Gadamer 1990:265ff; Rubin 1988:1840; Schutz 1974; Winch 1958). 
Those spectacles blind them to evidence their grand theory does not 
identify as relevant. Falsification of middle level propositions 
becomes impossible; ipso facto, falsification of a grand theory by 
evidence remains an impossible dream. (That constitutes the heart 
of post-modernism [Hunt 19 ] . The problem-solving methodology, 
however, rests on the premise that doing -- praxis -- can test the 
truth of middle-level propositions, and thus transform that dream 
into reality (Winch 1958:57, 100; Box 5.1). 
That doing -- praxis -- can and does falsify middle level 
propositions and thus, indirectly, grand theories, finds its 
warrant in three aspects of everyday experience: 
1) Acting purposively, people learn from their experience that 
causal relations structure real world phenomena, and that they can 
continually improve their comprehension of those causal 
relationships. To grow a tree, we plant not stones but seeds. We 
experience causality. To catch thieves, we put more policemen on 
the street. To act purposively, we rely upon our interpretations 
of experience. When our actions miss the mark, we reconsider the 
causal hypotheses on which we premised action, and sometimes even 
the conceptual lenses through which we originally perceived the 
project. 
2). To ensure they do not overlook potentially more fruitful 
explanatory hypotheses to put to empirical test, researchers must 
consider alternatives. Researchers concerned with development 
policy, for example, should consciously put on a Marxist hat, a 
Weberian hat, and an institutionalist hat. In each guise they 
should tease out the relevant middle level propositions which, 
according to that perspective, might explain their development 
problem. By critiquing the consistency of each resulting set of 
explanations with relevant known facts, they can winnow out those 
that seem worth testing against further evidence. 
Researchers' conscious consideration of alternatives will help 
to prevent them from becoming so immersed in their "own" paradigms 
that they exclude data tha:t other perspectives might call to 
attention. Once they have conscientiously examined but rejected 
explanations drawn from Marxist grand theory, researchers gathering 
evidence to falsify middle-level explanatory propositions derived 
from neo-classical economics can hardly avoid a sensitized 
peripheral vision relating to class and exploitation. Conversely, 
researchers who seek to capture data likely to falsify Marxist-
derived hypotheses can hardly prevent perceiving (if only 
peripherally) evidence of market.impediments (but cf. Rubin 1988). 
3) The conditions of social struggle press the participants 
to expand their perspectives. In an earlier epoch, for example, 
practically all white males in the United States assumed women and 
blacks had less capacity than themselves. By the end of the 
twentieth century, largely due to women's and blacks' intense 
agitation, many white males recognized that proposition as false. 
A problem-solving learning process requires investigators to 
recast their world views, or perspectives, as sets of logically 
conststent explanations, or grand theories; tease from them middle-
level time- and country-specific propositions; and test these 
against real world facts. If a specific proposition proves 
inconsistent with those facts, the researcher must either revise it 
so it both fits and remains logically consistent with the overall 
explanatory hypothesis; or reject it -- and with it, the grand 
theory from which it derived. 
Praxis, peripheral vision and social struggle: All combine to 
substantiate the premise that policy-oriented researchers can use 
evidence -- experience -- to falsify middle-level explanatory 
propositions, and therefore the grand theory from which they 
derived them. The criterion of reason informed by experience does 
not constitute mere kitsch. In principle, using grand theory as 
the guide to discretionary choices can help ensure that problem-
solving performs on its promise to ground policy on reason informed 
by experience. 
CONCLUSION 
The road to development runs long and rocky. The third 
world's difficulties in realizing development's promise reflected 
the failure of its post-colonial governors to exercise state power 
and law to change inappropriate institutions -- repetitive patters 
of social behavior -- that fostered poverty and oppression. 
Governors can change social institutions either in response to 
the imperatives of irrationality -- "values", intuitions, residues. 
The third world has tried that. The monumental disaster of most 
third world polities proclaims its failure. 
An alternative exists; The use of reason informed by 
experience as the basis of policy- and law-making. Law-make4rs 
deprive themselves of the potential for doing that if they adopt 
eityher the psitivist notion that values and facts occupy discrete 
spheres, or if they adopt the post-modernist view that the 
diswarrant of explanations of the world lies beyond human 
capabilities. Neither claim holds. A problem-solving methodology 
(instead of ends-means) holds the potential for reaching a proposal 
for solution that at every stage requires reason to formulate an 
hypothesis, and empirical data to warrant it. 
Whether that can succeed depends upon the guides to 
discretionary choice in problem-solving. Using Grand Theory to do 
that holds out the potential for using propositions themselves 
potentially grounded in data as a guide in the problem-solving 
process. Claims that one cannot diswarrant Grand Theory seem 
without adequate warrant, since both by diswarranting middle level 
pOropositions teased out of Grand Theory, by the use of peripheral 
vision, and the actual praxis of social struggle, the proposition 
of grand Theory become subject to diswarrant. 
The last decade of this century began with the hopes of third 
world independence littered in shards across a seemingly desolate 
moonscape. Dante inscribed one alternative over the gates to Hell: 
"Abandon all hope, ye who enter here." 
Another alternative exists. Human beings constructed that 
desolation; human beings can change it. They can only do so, 
however, by invoking their specifically human characteristics: 
Their capacities to solve common problems through democratic 
participation and cooperation grounded on reason informed by 
experience. 
